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Deterring Aggression in Asia

Broken Nest: Deterring China
from Invading Taiwan
Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris
©2021 Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris

ABSTR ACT: Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without reck lessly
threatening a great-power war is both possible and necessary through a tailored
deterrence package that goes beyond either fighting over Taiwan or abandoning
it. This article joins cutting-edge understandings of deterrence with empirical
evidence of Chinese strategic thinking and culture to build such a strategy.

W

Introduction

ould the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invade Taiwan if
it meant risking war with the United States and its allies? In
the past, it was clear Beijing had no appetite for starting a war
over Taiwan its military could not win. Today, however, a growing number of
US-based analysts are skeptical China can be deterred from attempting unification
with Taiwan by force. They claim Chinese leaders no longer tremble at the
prospect of the United States coming to the defense of Taipei because Beijing’s
top brass increasingly believes it would prevail in a war over the island.1
Some of Taiwan’s staunchest supporters argue for a strengthening of
US commitments in response to China’s growing confidence and assertiveness.
One familiar recommendation is for Washington to trade its long-standing policy
of “strategic ambiguity” (meant to leave both China and Taiwan guessing as to
how the United States would respond in the event of war) for “strategic clarity”
in favor of Taipei.2 This view claims the threat of a Chinese invasion has grown
only because the United States has failed to keep pace with China’s rising power.
If Beijing were convinced any move against Taiwan would be met with the
full force of the US military, then the risk of war would drop precipitously.
While the United States no doubt has a strong interest in deterring a
Chinese takeover of Taiwan, relying on the latent threat of a great-power war
is the wrong approach. Not only is such a strategy becoming less credible as
the regional military balance shifts in China’s favor, but it also requires both
1. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,” Foreign Affairs 100, no. 4
(July/August 2021): 58–67.
2. Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous: To Keep the Peace, Make
Clear to China That Force Won’t Stand,” Foreign Affairs, September 2, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous.
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the United States and Taiwan to accept unnecessarily high risks as the
price of maintaining a fragile peace. Instead, leaders in Washington and
Taipei should develop a joint strategy of deterrence by punishment to
convince their counterparts in China that, although Taiwan might be
conquerable in the short term, its capture would trigger the imposition of
unacceptable economic, political, and strategic costs upon Beijing. If done
correctly, such a strategy could discourage a Chinese invasion of Taiwan
while simultaneously lessening the chances of an unwanted great-power
conflict, especially if combined with good-faith efforts by the United States
to make the status quo more tolerable for both China and Taiwan.

The Threat of War
The US interest in preventing a PRC invasion of Taiwan is straightforward
and compelling. If Taiwan fell to China, a successful democracy would be
extinguished, and Beijing’s geopolitical position in East Asia would be enhanced
at the expense of the United States and its allies.3 Even analysts who caution
against inflating the strategic importance of Taiwan accept the fact that . . . all
things being equal, there are substantial costs and risks attached to abandoning
Taipei to China.4 Yet, the United States obviously has a countervailing interest
in avoiding war with Beijing.5 Such a conflict would be ruinous even if the
United States won—a misleading term, perhaps, given even a military action that
successfully averted a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would still leave the United
States in the unenviable position of “becoming the permanent defense force
for Taiwan.”6 Needless to say, with the changing military balance in East
Asia, it is entirely possible the United States would lose.7 Of course, if a
US-China war “went nuclear,” then the outcome could be nothing short of
cataclysmic for people in the United States, Taiwan, China, and elsewhere.
No matter how much the United States wishes to preserve Taiwan’s de
facto independence, the costs of war mean US responses suffer from serious
3. Blake Herzinger, “Abandoning Taiwan Makes Zero Moral or Strategic Sense,” Foreign Policy, May 3, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/03/taiwan-policy-us-china-abandon/.
4. Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and
Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 72–78.
5. Charles L. Glaser, “Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China,” Foreign Affairs,
April 28, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions
-taiwan-and-china; and Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2014), 102–4.
6. Daniel L. Davis, “The US Must Avoid War with China over Taiwan at All Costs,” Guardian,
October 5, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/oct/05/the-us-must-avoid-war-with
-china-over-taiwan-at-all-costs. See also Andrew Scobell, “How China Manages Taiwan and Its Impact on
PLA Missions,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, ed. Roy D. Kamphausen, David Lai, and
Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 32–35.
7. Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Military ‘Failed Miserably’ in a Fake Battle over Taiwan,” Popular Mechanics,
August 2, 2021, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a37158827/us-military-failed-miserably-in-taiwan
-invasion-wargame.
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credibility problems. Relying on an explicit or implicit threat of war to deter
China might even be counterproductive if it leads Beijing to assess that the
military balance across the Taiwan Strait permits an invasion. For example,
it might be rational for Chinese leaders to order an assault if they had
intelligence suggesting the United States would not fight—or would fight
and lose.
In previous decades, the United States enjoyed clear military supremacy
over China, and thus, American deterrence capabilities were more credible.
For example, in June 1950, President Harry Truman interposed the Seventh
Fleet between mainland China and Taiwan “to ‘neutralize’ the Taiwan
Strait” and to discourage Chinese forces from attempting an amphibious
attack.8 More than 40 years later, President Bill Clinton impressed America’s
military superiority upon Chinese leaders with the dispatch of two carrier
strike groups to the region—a show of force that, while successful in the
short term, had the long-term effect of convincing China’s leaders to pursue
massive investments in anti-ship ballistic missiles.9
Today, the United States has more difficulty engaging in such exercises
of “deterrence by denial.”10 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is now
powerful enough it probably could overrun Taiwan even if the United States
intervened to defend Taipei. Both sides know this—or at least strongly
suspect it. A Chinese analyst with connections in the PLA Navy told us
the PLA’s goal for a successful invasion was 14 hours, while it projects the
United States and Japan would require 24 hours to respond. If this scenario
is close to being accurate, China’s government might well be inclined to
attempt a fait accompli as soon as it is confident in its relative capabilities.
This perspective is consistent with thinking expressed in the PLA’s 2013
Science of Military Strategy, which exhorts the nation “to strive to catch the
enemy unexpectedly and attack him when he is not prepared, to seize and
control the battlefield initiative, paralyze and destroy the enemy’s operational
system and shock the enemy’s will for war.”11
Even if the United States intervened before China could secure a fait
accompli, Chinese strategists have growing confidence the United States
8. Abram N. Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2000), 7–8.
9. Tai Ming Cheung, “Racing from Behind: China and the Dynamics of Arms Chases and Races in
East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” in Arms Races in International Politics: From the Nineteenth to the
Twenty-First Century, ed. Thomas Mahnken, Joseph Maiolo, and David Stevenson (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 247–69.
10. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies,
1959); and Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018).
11. Shou Xiaosong, ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), translated
by the China Aerospace Studies Institute (Montgomery, AL: Air University, 2021), hereafter cited as Science of
Military Strategy, 143.
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would lose a war over Taiwan. If such a scenario played out, it would offer
China a major victory in terms of domestic and international prestige—
an enticing prospect for any leader, especially one intent on definitively
reestablishing China as a great power. Chinese strategic thinking emphasizes
the possibility and utility of limited wars and projects confidence in the
ability of war handlers to bring such an engagement to a favorable political
outcome. This strategy is precisely what the PRC attempted to execute in
the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969, and
the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. The fact that all of these operations were
successful militarily but failures politically seems to go unnoticed.
China’s
geographic
advantages
and
technological
advances
make it difficult for the United States to restore the credibility of a
deterrence-by-denial strategy. At most, bolstering the number and type of US
forces in the region could help reduce China’s expectations of a quick and
decisive victory. Beijing would not remain passive in the face of an expanded
US military footprint around Taiwan. To maintain long-term strategic
advantage, the United States must be willing to participate in an all-out
arms race with Beijing—one that could not easily be won, and which would
substantially reduce the chances of finding a diplomatic solution to the dispute.
This possibility does not mean China is altogether undeterrable. What it does
mean is deterrence must be based more on threats of penalties in response
to an invasion (deterrence by punishment) rather than threats to prevent
conquest from succeeding militarily (deterrence by denial). If penalties for
invading Taiwan can be made severe and credible enough, Beijing could
still be deterred from choosing such a course of action.12
Of course, America’s current policy toward Taiwan is already partly
based on the logic of deterrence by punishment—that is, an implicit threat
to wage a war against China that might not be limited to the Taiwan Strait.
The “AirSea Battle” concept, for example, included extensive strikes on the
Chinese mainland.13 From the US perspective, however, this military-heavy
version of deterrence by punishment is grossly unattractive. Not only does China
have good reasons to doubt whether the United States would follow through
with escalatory attacks, but it is not clear that China would emerge as the
biggest loser even if such strikes were meted out and China responded, either
asymmetrically or in kind. Moreover, even winning such a war would not provide
the United States and Taiwan a permanent sustainable resolution to the issue of
cross-Strait relations. We agree with Andrew Scobell’s point that “for the
12. Evan Braden Montgomery, “Primacy and Punishment: US Grand Strategy, Maritime Power, and Military
Options to Manage Decline,” Security Studies 29, no. 4 (2020): 769–96.
13. Jan van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010).
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Taiwan issue to be resolved once and for all, the outcome must be satisfactory
to Beijing.”14 Below, we propose a deterrence-by-punishment strategy that does
not hinge upon the credibility of a US threat to wage a great-power war against
China and which, while not offering a roadmap to a permanent resolution, at
least promises to lower the costs of the status quo for all concerned.

Beijing’s Changing Calculus
It would be better for the United States and Taiwan if a Chinese
invasion could be deterred without Washington having to threaten a greatpower war. Below, we aruge there are other options in this regard—options
worth exploring. But first, it is useful to consider why China has adopted
a more assertive position toward Taiwan in recent years. Informed analysts
now assess there is a nontrivial chance of a Chinese invasion within the
next decade. Why?
One reason is the military balance across and around the Taiwan Strait
has shifted in Beijing’s favor. China’s much vaunted anti-access/areadenial capabilities mean the PLA now stands a greater chance of keeping
US forces at bay than was feasible in the past, allowing the PLA to seize
what it calls the “three dominances”: (1) localized command of the sea, (2)
command of the air, and (3) command of information. In the event of war,
China’s advanced radar systems and overwhelming missile firepower would
now likely be enough to clinch victory in what Chinese strategists predict
would be a “localized war under informationized conditions.”15 Chinese
strategists have judged such a conflict as one of both high probability and
high danger, and so for more than two decades the PLA has focused on
preparing for such a scenario. From Beijing’s perspective, these preparations
greatly reduce the cost of action against Taiwan. As the PLA continues to
modernize and gain relative advantages over other actors in East Asia, the
costs of such action will continue to decrease.
On the other side of the ledger, the cost of restraint has increased for
China. The cost of restraint is a critical, but undertheorized, aspect of
deterrence.16 It indicates the acceptability of the status quo—in this case,
the acceptability of a prolonged irresolution to the dispute over Taiwan’s
political status. For China, the cost of restraint is increasing as Taiwan
moves further away from the mainland, particularly in terms of its core
national identity. The assertiveness of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive
14. Scobell, “How China Manages Taiwan,” 35.
15. Xiaosong, Science of Military Strategy, 123.
16. Kayse Jansen, “How Competition Undermines Deterrence” (graduate thesis, Missouri State University,
2021), https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/3666.
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Party and the associated decline of the Chinese Nationalist Party are concrete
representations of this shift. Since the Taiwanese view developments in
mainland China and Hong Kong with alarm—especially the PRC’s
anti-democratic policies—it is increasingly difficult to envisage Taiwan and China
“com[ing] together and mov[ing] forward in unison,” as Xi Jinping and other
PRC leaders insist must happen.17 It is small wonder growing numbers of
Taiwanese recoil at the idea of political union with Beijing, but if China perceives Taiwan
as rejecting the principle of peaceful reunification, its leaders might see no option but to
pursue a military solution.
Hawks in China blame the United States for encouraging what they see
as Taiwan’s shift away from the 1992 consensus of “one China with
different interpretations.”18 To them, US policies of reassurance seem
increasingly provocative. Whereas the United States once professed an interest
in upholding the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, China now suspects a
more aggressive policy that places Taiwan back under the US defense umbrella,
as it was before 1979. This perception is fueled by talk of Taiwan once again serving as a
useful outpost for the “free world.”19
The factors pushing China toward an invasion are not ones the United
States can easily forestall. China’s military gains can be blunted, but not
reversed. Nor is it possible for Washington to alter Taiwan’s domestic politics
or the fervor with which the PRC opposes the idea of indefinite Taiwanese
independence. Yet there are levers US leaders could pull to make an invasion of
Taiwan less desirable to China. First, the United States can raise the costs
of action for China via a deterrence-by-punishment strategy that threatens
Beijing, not with war, but with the frustration of its other national priorities.
Second, it can reduce the costs of restraint for China by making good-faith
efforts to fulfill the spirit of the US-China rapprochement vis-à-vis Taiwan.
These two goals can be pursued in tandem with a view to strengthening
deterrence, enhancing the long-term stability of cross-Strait relations, and
thereby furthering the national security interests of both the United States and
Taiwan—and, perhaps, even the PRC. In what follows, we take each lever in turn.
17. Xi Jinping, “Speech at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the Communist Party of China,” Qiushi
Journal (English edition), July 1, 2021, https://en.qstheory.cn/2021-09/08/c_657713.htm; Yang Zhong,
“Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 99 (2016): 336–52,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1104866; Qiang Xin, “Having Much in Common? Changes and
Continuity in Beijing’s Taiwan Policy,” Pacific Review 34, no. 6 (2020): 926–45, https://doi.org/10.1080
/09512748.2020.1773908; and Frédéric Krumbein, “The Human Rights Gap in the Taiwan Strait: How China
Pushes Taiwan towards the US,” Pacific Review, September 1, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020.18
12699.
18. Lindsay Maizland,“Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated
May 10, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy.
19. Ted Yoho, “Free World Must Embrace Taiwan,” Taipei Times, April 20, 2021, https://www.taipeitimes
.com/News/editorials/archives/2021/04/20/2003755998.
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The Broken Nest
A Chinese proverb asks, “Beneath a broken nest, how (can) there be any whole
eggs?”20 The proverb means if the United States cannot prevent China from
seizing Taiwan by force, it should instead develop a strategy to convince China’s
leaders an invasion would produce a peace more injurious than the status quo.
As noted previously, the United States already incorporates the logic of deterrence
by punishment into its overall Taiwan strategy. What distinguishes the broken
nest approach from other deterrence-by-punishment proposals is that it
does not rely upon America’s willingness to use military force; the strategy
is unique in the sense that it has the potential to deter China from invading
Taiwan while also reassuring all sides a great-power war is not being threatened
by the United States.
Short of military reprisals, the United States could levy a number of penalties
on Beijing. The most obvious first step is to make Taiwan more resilient to an
invasion, such as through the purchase of the right kind of defensive weapons
from the United States (for example, truck-mounted harpoons, mobile rocket
systems, and surf-zone sea mines).21 Progress has been made recently in this
regard.22 The more Taiwan can credibly threaten to wage a war of necessity
to defend itself, the less the United States will have to threaten to wage its own
war of choice. Leaders in Taipei must also convince Beijing it would face a long
and costly struggle to repress Taiwan’s 23.5 million citizens.23 At minimum,
Beijing must anticipate widespread civil disobedience. More seriously, China
could be made to expect guerrilla warfare in Taiwan and perhaps even the
prospect of violence being exported to the mainland. At present, Taiwanese
vary by how far they support fighting a “war of necessity” to defend their
island.24 For deterrence to work, it will be important for leaders in Taipei to

20. John S. Rohsenow, ABC Dictionary of Chinese Proverbs (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press,
2002), 102.
21. Patrick Porter and Michael Mazarr, Countering China’s Adventurism over Taiwan: A Third Way
(Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2021), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism
-over-taiwan-third-way; and William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College
Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 1–27.
22. Matthew Strong, “Harpoon Missile System Delivery to Taiwan Will Be Completed 2028,” Taiwan News,
October 22, 2021, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4322413.
23. “Taiwan,” World Factbook, updated October 18, 2021, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries
/taiwan/.
24. Yao-Yuan Yeh and Charles K. S. Wu, “When War Hits Home: Taiwanese Public Support for War
of Necessity,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 21, no. 2 (May 2021): 265–93; and Chung-li Wu and
Alex Min-Wei Lin, “The Certainty of Uncertainty: Taiwanese Public Opinion on U.S.-Taiwan Relations in
the Early Trump Presidency,” World Affairs 182, no. 4 (November 11, 2019): 350–69.
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consolidate domestic support for resisting Chinese aggression and to build
resistance capabilities. 25
On its own, however, the expectation of facing a robust but eventually
unsuccessful defense is unlikely to deter a Chinese invasion. Beijing must
also be made to believe conquering Taiwan, while satisfying one core goal
of the Chinese state, cannot be done without jeopardizing other core
interests. In practice, this strategy means assuring China an invasion
of Taiwan would produce a major economic crisis on the mainland, not
the technological boon some have suggested would occur as a result of
the PRC absorbing Taiwan’s robust tech industry. 26
To start, the United States and Taiwan should lay plans for a targeted
scorched-earth strategy that would render Taiwan not just unattractive
if ever seized by force, but positively costly to maintain. This could
be done most effectively by threatening to destroy facilities belonging
to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the most
important chipmaker in the world and China’s most important supplier.
Samsung based in South Korea (a US ally) is the only alternative for
cutting-edge designs. Despite a huge Chinese effort for a “Made in
China” chip industry, only 6 percent of semiconductors used in China
were produced domestically in 2020. 27 If Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company’s facilities went offline, companies around the
globe would find it difficult to continue operations. 28 This development
would mean China’s high-tech industries would be immobilized at
precisely the same time the nation was embroiled in a massive war effort.
Even when the formal war ended, the economic costs would persist for
years. This problem would be a dangerous cocktail from the perspective
of the Chinese Communist Party, the legitimacy of which is predicated
on promises of domestic tranquility, national resilience, and sustained
economic growth.
The challenge, of course, is to make such a threat credible to Chinese
decisionmakers. They must absolutely believe Taiwan’s semiconductor
industry would be destroyed in the event of an invasion. If China
suspects Taipei would not follow through on such a threat, then
25. See Otto C. Fiala, Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special
Operations University Press, 2020).
26. Rachel Esplin Odell et al., “Strait of Emergency?: Debating Beijing’s Threat to Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-08-09/strait-emergency.
27. Wei Sheng, “China Made 6% of Chips It Used in 2020: Report,” technode, February 19, 2021,
https://technode.com/2021/02/19/china-made-6-of-chips-it-used-in-2020-report/.
28. David Pierson and Michelle Yun, “The Most Important Company You’ve Never Heard of Is Being
Dragged into the U.S.-China Rivalry,” Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2020, https://www.latimes.com
/world-nation/story/2020-12-17/taiwan-chips-tsmc-china-us.
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deterrence will fail. An automatic mechanism might be designed,
which would be triggered once an invasion was confirmed. In addition,
Taiwan’s leaders could make it known now they will not allow these
industries to fall into the hands of an adversary. 29 The United States and
its allies could support this endeavor by announcing plans to give refuge
to highly skilled Taiwanese working in this sector, creating contingency
plans with Taipei for the rapid evacuation and processing of the human
capital that operates the physical semiconductor foundries.
Such a “broken nest” approach is not without precedent. Sweden made
an analogous threat of selective scorched earth during World War II with
reference to its iron ore mines—a key source for industrial war materials—
as part of its overall strategy of anti-Nazi deterrence.30 Taiwan’s threat
would become even more potent than Sweden’s if Taipei made and publicized
plans to target the mainland’s chip-fabrication lines using cruise and
ballistic missiles, including the Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corporation facility in Shanghai. A preplanned sanctions campaign against
any chip exports to China, led by the United States but supported by South
Korea and other allies, would enhance this approach.
No doubt the Taiwanese will have grave concerns about threatening
China with a defensive war that likely cannot be won. The prospects of
implementing scorched-earth and guerilla-warfare tactics will be similarly
unappealing. It will therefore be a major challenge to make these threats
credible to China, though perhaps not as difficult as convincing Beijing that
Taiwan and the United States are willing to risk a great-power war over
Taiwan’s political status. Paradoxically, however, it is only by making these
threats credible that they will never have to be carried out. In any case, the
threats outlined above—even if carried out to the maximum extent—will
be far less devastating to the people of Taiwan than the US threat of greatpower war, which would see massive and prolonged fighting in, above, and
beside Taiwan.
Nevertheless, it would be prudent to develop a deterrence-by-punishment
strategy that does not entirely rely upon threats made by the Taiwanese.
Other aspects of a this type of strategy might include economic sanctions and
threats in coordination with America’s regional allies, especially Japan (the
actor in East Asia with the greatest disparity between latent and actualized
29. James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American
Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2944796.
30. M. Gunnar Hägglöf, “A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War,” International Affairs 36,
no. 2 (April 1, 1960): 153–67.
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power), to worsen China’s long-term regional security environment.31 At
minimum, the US government should take the lead in developing credible
threats of economic sanctions and political isolation, focusing especially
on the semiconductor sector—where many necessary high-tech inputs
originate from a handful of American companies—leaving leaders in
Beijing under no illusions about the punishments that would flow from
an invasion of Taiwan. More severely, the United States might signal an
attack on Taiwan would lead to a green light for allies such as Japan, South
Korea, and Australia to develop their own nuclear arsenals. If China can be
made to believe invading Taiwan will result in one or more additional
nuclear powers aligning against it, then this possibility ought to be an
effective deterrent.
Such threats would have the advantage of making the Taiwan issue not
just a battle of wills between the United States and China, but a fundamental
question of what China wants its place in the region and wider world to be.
Does China want to provoke the ire of its Asian neighbors, or would it prefer
to advance its ambitions of regional leadership and peaceful cooperation?
Again, the purpose here must be to convince Chinese leaders invading
Taiwan will come at the cost of core national objectives: economic growth,
domestic tranquility, secure borders, and perhaps even the maintenance of
regime legitimacy.
On their own, none of these expected punishments would suffice to deter
a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Taken together, though, they might prove
effective. If calibrated properly, a deterrence-by-punishment strategy would
make an attack irrational from the Chinese perspective. This result must be the
goal of a US and Taiwanese joint strategy.

Reducing the Costs of Restraint
One possible objection to our argument is, since reunification with Taiwan
is a long-standing objective of the Chinese state—a goal motivated by
nationalism, irredentism, and the Chinese Communist Party’s perpetual
quest for domestic legitimacy—China’s leaders will not pause to calculate
costs and benefits when weighing a decision to invade Taiwan. If this view
is correct, the possibility of deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, whether
by denial or by threats of punishment, is minimal indeed.
Analysts in the United States cannot rule out the possibility China might
one day embark upon an invasion of Taiwan regardless of the costs. It would
31. Robert D. Blackwill and Philip Zelikow, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War,
Council Special Report no. 90 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021), 45.
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be wrong, however, for America to base its Taiwan policy upon the belief
China’s leaders are irrational, or to lock itself into a strategy that would be
catastrophic if China acted recklessly. In the past, China has been persuaded
the status quo across the Taiwan Strait is tolerable, despite Chinese strategists
describing Taiwan as a “core interest” that admits no “room to maneuver.”32
As noted previously, Beijing also recognizes other core interests such
as national development, the pursuit of international prestige, and the
maintenance of domestic stability—all of which might be jeopardized by an
ill-judged conquest of Taiwan.33
The Chinese Communist Party has two principal objectives with
deadlines: to “basically realize” “socialist modernization” by 2035 and to
become a “great modern socialist country” by 2049.34 Given China’s internal
demographic, ecological, social, and economic challenges, these goals will be
difficult for the PRC to accomplish. They will become impossible targets if a
successful invasion of Taiwan is met with the punishments described above.
The rest of the “China Dream” will similarly be thrown into disarray. Strategy
is about balancing key interests—something Chinese leaders understand well.35
In a 1975 meeting, Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong discussed when Taiwan
would return to the mainland. Mao said: “In a hundred years.” Kissinger replied:
“It won’t take a hundred years. Much less.” Mao then rejoined: “It’s better for
it to be in your hands. And if you were to send it back to me now, I
would not want it, because it’s not wantable. There are a huge bunch of
counter-revolutionaries there.”36 The goal of the broken nest strategy should
be to make Taiwan, given the PRC’s broader interests, unwantable.
Still, Beijing must be reassured that choosing to forgo an invasion of
Taiwan would not be tantamount to losing Taiwan. Raising the costs of a
Chinese invasion must constitute only one part of the solution to the current
strategic quandary; Taiwan and the United States must also move to ease
China’s costs of restraint. Washington must restate in unambiguous terms
the status of Taiwan is undetermined, that the United States has no plans to
support independent statehood for Taiwan, and it will not seek to shift the
status quo using gray-zone tactics that violate the spirit of Sino-American
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rapprochement. Simultaneously, Washington must remain implacably opposed
to a forcible resolution of the Taiwan question.
Unlike strategies placing the threat of military reprisal at their core,
a deterrence-by-punishment strategy does not rely on the United States
bolstering its military forces in Northeast Asia. This approach leaves the
United States some room to adopt a force posture capable of reassuring
allies such as Japan and South Korea about their collective defense,
while also convincing both Taiwan and China the United States is
truly committed to maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
It also frees the US military to divest itself from vulnerable bases in Japan
that may on balance make great-power war more, rather than less, likely—
via a preemptive Chinese attack in an active-defense situation. Shifting the
burden of deterrence from military reprisal to non-military punishment
might also reduce the likelihood of a war caused by miscalculation,
while also removing the pretext that China’s buildup is a response to
US and Taiwanese provocations.
Of course, there are dangers associated with reducing the US military
footprint around Taiwan. Careful research and planning must be conducted
in conjunction with regional partners to ascertain what level and type
of US forward deployment would be necessary to reassure allies while
also lessening the chances of war. There should be no drawdown of
military forces until such a time as a credible deterrence-by-punishment
strategy has been put in place; otherwise Beijing might perceive a
window of opportunity to wage a successful attack. Additionally, Taiwan
might be less encouraged to stage an independent fight against China if
it no longer believes the United States would (or could) intervene on its
behalf. That said, given reports about low morale in the Taiwanese Armed
Forces, as well as low defense spending (around 2 percent of GDP), a shock
to the status quo might be just what the situation requires. Regardless,
relying less on threats of force is not the same as ruling out the use of
force altogether. Ambiguity will always exist about whether the United
States would use force in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. 37
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Conclusion: Deterrence and Reassurance
The policy of the United States must be to discourage the use of
military force to upend the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. US foreign
policy, however, must also consider the reality of the situation: military
deterrence is becoming less credible than in the past. Additionally,
relying on military power to deter Chinese aggression requires the US
and Taiwanese governments to burden their citizens with high risks.
A new approach to deterrence is needed, one that relies less on the
dangerous threat of military force than is presently the case.
A twofold strategy of raising the costs of breaking Taiwan’s nest
while faithfully maintaining the value of an unbroken nest is the most
prudent way to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and, thus, avoiding a
great-power war. China must be made to believe there are no overall
gains to be had from a military invasion of Taiwan, whereas there are
considerable advantages to maintaining the status quo. In the final analysis,
a strategy based purely—or even mostly—upon military deterrence
cannot achieve these goals. Unless US leaders are truly willing to fight
World War III in defense of Taiwan, they would do well to consider
strategies of deterrence that do not rely upon the threat of a military
reprisal. We have argued it is possible to imagine such an alternative
strategy of deterrence—one that relies on nonmilitary means of severe
punishment rather than an expectation of being able to repel militarily a
Chinese invasion.
That said, we are clear-sighted about the difficulties of orchestrating a
credible strategy of deterrence by punishment. Not least of all, a broken
nest strategy means accepting China can likely conquer Taiwan if it
chooses to do so. It also means laying plans to destroy key Taiwanese
infrastructure at great economic cost. Nonetheless, we maintain China
could probably conquer Taiwan even if the United States intervened.
Morevover, the social and economic costs of a great-power conflict would
dwarf the targeted demolition of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry or the
inevitable harms produced by an insurgency.
To conclude, the broken nest strategy hinges on the United States
not taking any action that China’s leaders would interpret as an act of
war. In such a situation, if Beijing did consider the United States an
active belligerent, it might initiate first strikes against US forces. This
possibility must be considered seriously. There are few ways to deter a
Chinese invasion of Taiwan that involve zero risk of conflict. For the next
decade or so, the best way to deter Chinese aggression while lowering
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the chance of a great-power conflict is to follow the path outlined above:
if war, a broken nest; if peace, a tolerable status quo.
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